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where, in order to get an analytical solution to a 
model, the author has to assume away almost 
every interesting feature of the problem to the 
point that the remaining model is uninteresting 
and uninformative. But that at least qualifies the 
paper for possible publication in Econometrica, 
RESTud, or JET.
Come on, give it a go. The book takes less time 
than two NFL football games and has more 
excitement and action.
James R. Markusen
University of Colorado at Boulder
C Mathematical and Quantitative 
Methods
Schelling’s Game Theory: How to Make 
Decisions. By Robert V. Dodge. Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 
xii, 292. $39.95. ISBN 978–0–19–985720–3. 
 JEL 2012–0365
A few years ago, I attended a conference with 
an unusual format. Speakers presented research 
papers of other attendees, rather than their own. 
This worked surprisingly well. It is enlightening 
to see the points that presenters other than the 
author emphasize, the ancillary bits a disinter-
ested person appends, and the ease with which 
a person can “kill one’s darlings” when they are 
not, in fact, his darlings. Is something lost in the 
translation? Of course. But we are not necessarily 
worse off. Especially when trying to broaden the 
work’s appeal.
Something analogous is going on with Robert 
Dodge’s new book, Schelling’s Game Theory: 
How To Make Decisions. Dodge is a Schelling 
biographer (The Strategist, 2006) who teaches 
at a private high school in Singapore. He was a 
student in Schelling’s “Conflict, Cooperation and 
Strategy” course at the Kennedy School, and 
later adapted the course for his own students 
with the goal of bringing Schelling’s methods to 
a more general audience. This book is an exten-
sion of that effort. Schelling assisted by making 
his course materials available to Dodge, and he 
happily endorses the book as a “compendium of 
a course that I taught for graduates and under-
graduates at Harvard for thirty years and at the 
University of Maryland for fifteen.”  
Dodge clearly is a practiced presenter of 
Schelling’s work, and of game theory more gener-
ally. His explanations are accessible enough for 
novices but meaty enough for all but the most 
advanced readers. The book covers the founda-
tions of game theory—from basic strategic con-
cepts through workhorse, two-player models 
and eventually to group decisions and outcomes. 
In most cases, this coverage has a Schelling-
esque slant, whether due to the contribution of 
Schelling’s own work or through his illustrations 
and historical detours. Dodge even includes some 
practice problems from Schelling’s course, as well 
as the famous questionnaire from his earliest 
coordination experiments (which Vince Crawford 
once suggested marked the beginning of experi-
mental economics). 
To bring this kind of source material to a broader 
audience is a great cause. Dodge enhances that 
contribution by adding considerably to Schelling’s 
material. Most surprisingly via extended excerpts 
from other published works, including Robert 
Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation, Dixit and 
Nalebuff’s Thinking Strategically, and Tim 
Harford’s The Logic of Life,  as well as articles 
from Paul Krugman, Steven Levitt, and John 
A. Paulos. These are an unexpected delight. If 
Dodge’s book is a course on game theory, these 
authors are guest lecturers. It’s takes humility to 
step aside for guest lecturers. But typical of any-
time one can find guest lecturers of this quality, 
the “students”—Dodge’s readers—benefit. 
The Axelrod excerpt is notable because Dodge 
not only quotes his classic book extensively, he 
includes personal correspondence with him. 
Through this we hear Axelrod on the problem of 
noise for a Tit-for-Tat strategy, a discussion that 
concludes with his stating a preference for Tit-for-
Tat with “a little generosity or contrition.”
Dodge uses such exchanges throughout the 
book. We learn directly from Singapore’s Prime 
Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, about the influence 
of Schelling’s tipping point research on the coun-
try’s efforts to fight segregation.  We hear from 
Robert McNamara, Ted Sorensen, and Sergei 
Krushchev (Nikita Krhuschev’s son) about strate-
gic interaction in the Cuban Missile Crisis. And 
we hear from Siddharth Mohandas, a one-time 
editor at Foreign Affairs, of Schelling’s use of 
game theory when pushing a manuscript through 
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the editorial process. “The episode only increased 
my respect for the man,” Mohandas said. “He 
practices what he preaches!”
As much color as these additions bring, 
Dodge’s greatest contribution is weaving 
Schelling’s contributions and history through-
out his discussion of game theory. This allows 
themes connecting Schelling’s work to emerge 
over the course of the book. We see how rooted 
Schelling is in real-world phenomena, and how 
that rootedness improves his theory. We see in 
his surprising conclusions that outcomes both 
heroic and tragic can flow from rational actors. 
And we see that despite this focus on rational-
ity, he deeply appreciates the importance of the 
irrational.
This focus on Schelling is as it should be. But 
the reader senses there are corners of game the-
ory, especially newer ones, where the light is sim-
ply not shown. It would have been nice to have 
these corners outlined and acknowledged, even 
if unelaborated, in order to position Schelling’s 
work (and his course) in the full field as it stands 
now.  
But this kind of academic positioning is not 
the objective of the book. Dodge has other con-
tributions to make. Indeed, it is by going beyond 
a standard telling of game theory that he crafts 
a unique book. In doing so, Dodge succeeds in 
rendering Schelling’s course for a general audi-
ence. The book’s format is closest to a text book, 
and it would work well in that capacity in under-
graduate programs and professional schools. But 
its size, accessibility, and color make this format 
easy to forget. There are many chapters and sup-
plements that would stand alone as readings in 
a broad range of classes. And anyone teaching 
a course involving strategic behavior would find 
the book useful for historical anecdotes and cur-
rent examples. 
Overall, Dodge’s book provides a solid intro-
duction to game theory, more than expected 
about the field’s history, and a nice overview of 
Schelling’s work. In this effort, Dodge is a faith-
ful steward of Schelling’s course, but not without 
the trimming, shaping, and supplementing only 
an outsider could provide. The result is a game 
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In the last decades, the around-the-world trans-
formation of public and private pension schemes 
from defined benefit to defined contribution plans 
has placed increased risk and responsibility on 
participants. Coupled with the financial pressures 
on pension systems brought on by an aging popu-
lation and more recently the financial crisis, this 
has meant that households today need to be much 
more financially savvy to maintain their retire-
ment security. So far, this has proved to be a chal-
lenge and the behavioral economics literature has 
provided a number of clues to individual retire-
ment behavior. In this book, Clark, Strauss and 
Knox-Hayes take the analysis one step further and 
challenge the standard economic model by inte-
grating the impact of social and environmental 
factors in participants’ financial decision making.  
Chapter 1 sets the scene and describes the 
development of pensions and the increased need 
for financial decision making. The authors review 
the literature and demonstrate that individuals 
on average are risk averse, shy away from finan-
cial opportunities that are rational according to 
theory and are not very good at using informa-
tion. But the evidence also reveals a considerable 
variation in financial literacy: 20 percent of the 
population appears to have very poor knowledge 
while 20 percent can be characterized as sophis-
ticated investors. In between a group that at best 
can be characterized as naïve investors, but who 
are expected to be active and well-informed con-
sumers of financial products. To further under-
stand individual behavior in financial markets the 
authors argue that is necessary to integrate the 
environment in which individuals live: cultural and 
societal interactions matter for how we make deci-
sions as well as personal relationships. Chapter 2 
presents the theoretical framework. The chapter 
builds on the findings in behavioral economics but 
add the interaction of environment and behavior. 
In the following two chapters, the authors pres-
ent empirical analysis using data from the United 
